governing manufactured goods important to everyday life ran up against the political, social, and judicial responses to them. 26 Nowhere was this more apparent than in the case of the Harrow Trust and National Harrow.
The story of the Harrow Trust begins with the invention in 1869 by David L. Garver of the spring tooth harrow, 27 one of three types of harrows generally used by farmers to cultivate land. 28 Garver's invention, a flexible harrow tooth that glides over obstacles in soil, enjoyed little success until 1877 when Dewitt C. Reed invented an improved version that allowed for adjusting the tooth down or up to create more or less depth in the soil. 29 Together, the Garver and Reed patents formed the foundation for almost all postbellum spring tooth harrow technology. 30 Other manufacturers entered the spring tooth harrow field in competition with these companies "in hostility to the same letters patent." 31 Some manufacturers obtained their own patents covering structural arrangements, the only features generally not believed to be controlled by Garver, Reed, and other prior art. 32 By 1888, one source reported some twenty-five to thirty different harrows being manufactured under as many different patents. 33 Eventually, the Garver patent came to be owned by Reed, 34 who sued multiple companies for patent infringement, many of which allegedly settled for "considerable sums of money" at some time prior to September 1890. 35 After the Garver patent expired in 1886, the owners of the Reed patent (by then, Reed & Co. in the Midwest and Olin & Co. in the state of New York) 36 continued to claim "every one infringed their patents." 37 Reed and Olin entered into licenses with the four largest harrow manufacturers to settle all of these litigations involving the Reed patents.
38
These six firms (referred to in the harrow trade as "the Big Six"), 39 who were related only as licensees and licensors at that point, organized the formation of National Harrow Company ("National Harrow") in the fall of 1890. 40 The Big Six planned to assign all of the relevant 32 Strait, supra note 28, at 16. 33 Id. GEOGRAPHY 203, 216 (1987) . As harrow production moved from local blacksmith shops to these large factories, harrow firms, like other farm implement manufacturers, engaged in forward integration that allowed them to control distribution, to allow for credit purchases, and not insignificantly, to best compete for sales to farmers. patents in the spring harrow field to a newly organized corporation, National Harrow, and to accept licenses and capital stock in return. 41 The firms hoped to reduce expenditures on patent infringement litigation and to stabilize prices (in fact, the company bragged about lowering prices despite this consolidation of competitors into one national firm). 42 To this end, National
Harrow's organizers also sought harrow firms outside of the Big Six to assign their patents to the company, including Bement and other manufacturers who had been heavily involved in patent infringement litigation over the Reed and Garver patents. 43 Most of these manufacturers entered into form agreements that assigned their respective patents and all of their existing rights under them to National Harrow in exchange for capital stock in an amount to be determined by an arbitrator and for the exclusive license to manufacture only those harrows that they had been making and selling prior to joining National Harrow. 44 Eventually, the number of firms who assigned their patents, licenses, and good will to National Harrow increased to twenty-six 41 Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 13-15, 146-47. 42 Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 147. National markets for farm implements following the Civil War had resulted in "[f]renzied competition and price-cutting" in these sectors. Pudup, supra note 40, at 217. Notably, the price provision was critical for courts finding the licenses void as against public policy. See, e.g., Strait v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 18 N.Y.S. 224, 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891). 43 Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 129. 44 See, e.g., Bement v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 78 (1902) . All of the assignment and license agreements were to be signed and placed into an escrow pending execution by all of the firms, at which point the agreements would become operative. Id. at 86 n.1. Bement never executed its first set. Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 63. William Strait executed but successfully sued to cancel his agreements prior to them becoming operative. Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 162. Later, some firms took licenses from National Harrow to manufacture and sell harrows without contributing patents to the pool. See Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 146. These firms simply agreed to a price schedule and royalty scheme for specified harrow models. See Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 146. overall, including E. Bement & Sons ("Bement"), a harrow manufacturer brought in early in the fall of 1890 on the heels of its own litigation with the Big Six firms. 45 Even after the patent assignments and license agreements were executed by and between National Harrow, the Big Six and others referred to as outsiders, 46 National Harrow continued to bring patent infringement suits against harrow manufacturers and dealers not in the trust, 47 as well as licensees and dealers who sold harrows in violation of the license restrictions. 48 In addition to this vast amount of litigation, National Harrow also waged a media campaign intending to funnel sales to the trust licensees with boasts about infringement suits and threats to bring more against dealers and farmers. 49 As a result of this exposure, challenges to the legality of the trust agreements commenced almost immediately by parties facing National Harrow in court.
50
In a very early case, William Strait (an inventor on several patents in his own right and proprietor of erstwhile National Harrow licensee, Clipper Chilled Plow Company ("Clipper")), 51 sued National Harrow to set aside its agreements, then in escrow awaiting the other firms to 45 Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 128. Bement entered into a preliminary agreement in September 1890, placed into escrow, which never became operative due to a condition failure sometime before May 1891. Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 63. , so that Strait could be free to set his own price for harrows. 53 The court, finding no breach or failure of condition by National Harrow, described the plaintiffs as "hav[ing] no cause of complaint, unless the contract made is an illegal contract, as hostile to the public good." 54 The court observed that the spring tooth harrow monopolized the harrow market, that all of the manufacturers in the spring tooth harrow market in 1890 had entered into identical agreements with National Harrow, and that all of the manufacturers agreed to not make and sell spring tooth harrows for fifty years except as licensees and agents of National Harrow, and then only as to those styles of harrows each of them manufactured prior to entering into the National Harrow agreement. 55 Given this state of affairs, the court found that National Harrow intended to "engross the market, control prices, and prevent competition," a practice condemned by the common law as an unlawful restraint of trade, if not the new Sherman Act.
56
After Strait, the press eagerly reported that a New York court had declared National
Harrow "a Trust which has undertaken to control absolutely the manufacture and sale of harrows in Other licensees also succeeded in defending contract claims brought by National Harrow.
60 National Harrow sued Hench & Dromgold ("Hench"), a harrow manufacturer in the trust, for selling harrows at prices below the specified prices in the license agreements. 61 In defense, Hench claimed that the agreements were void as against public policy because the licenses represented unlawful restraints in trade under Pennsylvania common law. 62 The court sided with Hench, declaring its licenses invalid and unenforceable. 63 The Third Circuit confirmed on appeal, explaining,
The fact that the property involved is covered by letters patent is urged as a justification; but we do not see how any importance can be attributed to this fact. Patents confer a monopoly as respects the property covered by them, but they confer no right upon the owners of several distinct patents to combine for the purpose of restraining competition and trade.
64
The Strait and Hench suits demonstrated that courts generally were willing to find the National Harrow license agreements unenforceable as a matter of contract law, but the nature of private adjudication left the remaining licenses valid and subject to enforcement by National The court refused to deprive National Harrow of its legal right to bring suit for patent infringement, despite the previous decision that the licenses were unlawful restraints in trade. Strait, 51 F. at 820. Indeed, according to the court, it would be impertinent [to inquire into the character of the combination] as one in respect to the moral character or antecedents of the plaintiff in an ordinary suit for trespass upon his property. Even a gambler, or the keeper of a brothel, cannot be deprived of his property because he is an obnoxious person or a criminal; and it is no defense to the trespass upon it, unless it was removed or destroyed in the suppression of a nuisance, that it was used in carrying on the unlawful occupation. Hench, 84 F. at 227. The nullification of the licenses in Pennsylvania rendered the patent assignments unenforceable as well. As the court noted, "To place any other interpretation upon the [Pennsylvania] decision is to make it a mere brutum fulmen leading to results so illogical and inequitable as to border on the grotesque." Id.
Id

71
Hanby, 54 F. at 494. 72 Id. The remaining reported cases featured parties outside of the trust who found themselves losing customers or dealers due to the trust's threats. 74 Typically, National Harrow widely circulated letters announcing that National Harrow's patents had been sustained in the courts, that certain manufacturers (and, by extension, his customers and dealers) infringed certain patents, and that unless those dealers and customers ceased carrying the alleged infringer's harrows, National Harrow would bring suit. 75 The company warned that this would subject their customers or dealers to high costs because allegedly infringing manufacturers so often lacked financial responsibility.
76
When the trust sued Quick & Lindahl, a harrow dealer in Chesterton, Indiana, for patent infringement in 1895, the defendant countered that National Harrow should be declared illegal as a common law restraint in trade. 77 The district court agreed, stating carefully, and Hench's harrows to threaten future suits against still more manufacturers, dealers, and even customers if they did not heed the trust's warnings about manufacturing and selling unlicensed harrows. Id. In an advertisement directed to dealers, National Harrow described favorable resolution of Hench matter and invited dealers to report on others selling unlicensed harrows. The common law forbids the organization of such combinations, composed of numerous corporations and firms. They are dangerous to the peace and good order of society, and they arrogate to themselves the exercise of powers destructive of the right of free competition in the markets of the country, and, by their aggregate power and influence, imperil the free and pure administration of justice.
78
Although National Harrow claimed that a valid patent entitled it to protection from infringement by anyone, the court declined to "lend the countenance of the court to the creation of combinations, trusts, or monopolies." 79 The Indiana court also held that the defendant's harrow did not infringe the patent in suit; it practiced a different, non-infringing patent. requested that the company be enjoined from circulating among complainant's customers and agents letters by which they are falsely and maliciously informed that the defendant's patents have been sustained by the courts, that the complainant's harrows are infringements thereon, and that, unless they desist from handling and selling the same, suits will be brought by defendant against them . . . . Id. at 132 ("The common law does not prohibit the making of such combinations. It merely declines, after they have been made, to recognize their validity, by refusing to make any decree or order which will in any way give aid to the purposes of such combinations."). 80 Id. at 134. The district court dismissed the case on demurrer-holding that any price controls or competition suppression would be "immaterial" to the question of patent infringement, if true. 83 The court described the patent owner as having every right to "us[e] all lawful means to protect his monopoly." 84 The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal on demurrer, and allowed the suit to proceed with the plaintiff's allegations. 85 The circuit court acknowledged that it agreed with the lower court's assessment of a patent as a monopoly, but also questioned whether the notices had been given in bad faith to destroy the business of another, in which case a court should not refuse to step in to protect against "property rights being fraudulently assailed."
86
When another infringement defendant, a dealer of harrows made by licensee Eureka
Grower Company, sought a preliminary injunction against National Harrow to cease distributing inflammatory circulars, the court described the company's activity in less than flattering terms, accusing National Harrow of "barking" as well as "biting" such that its conduct was "fast reaching the point . . . where its conduct may be deemed unnecessarily harsh and oppressive."
Id.
84
Id. On previous occasions they have shown some little familiarity with the art of advertising, but never before have they been so perniciously active as during the past few months. Not only have they kept up a well sustained system of 'barking,' but they have done some 'biting' as well, in the form of suits against 9 or 10 alleged infringers of one of the defendant's patents. The circulars and letters, which, at the time this action was commenced, were descending upon the farmers from a seemingly inexhaustible supply are all, substantially, of the same purport. They contain an assertion that the Davison harrow infringes the defendant's patents and particularly the patent granted to Reed and Clark. Dealers who purchase the Davison harrow are threatened with prosecution. A list of those against whom suits have been commenced is given and also a list of defendant's licensees with a statement that harrows can be bought of them which are free from any charge of infringement. One of the complainants' customers has received 13 of these warnings, and that substantial duplicates of the same notice have been sent again and again to the same Yet, the court did not issue an injunction (distinguishing the demurrer) and pushed the parties to calmly await the outcome of the infringement suit. 88 Similarly, Adriance, Platt & Company, a manufacturer not in the trust, brought suit against National Harrow for libel after an allegation of infringement. 89 When confronted by
Adriance, who requested that it bring an infringement suit to settle the question, National Harrow allegedly replied "that it proposed to prevent the complainant from building harrows in its own way." 90 Although the lower court found that "the defendant was acting within its rights, and that the letters and circulars were legitimate notices to infringers of these rights," 91 the Second Circuit held that bad faith permeated the case-the purpose was to intimidate customers and coerce
Adriance into taking a license-and enjoined National Harrow from harassing conduct.
92
persons is not disputed. Although it would seem that the defendant is fast reaching the point, if indeed it has not already reached it, where its conduct may be deemed unnecessarily harsh and oppressive, the court should hesitate to interfere by injunction so long as there remains a reasonable doubt as to the propriety of such a course. In these causes the court is embarking, with only a crude chart, upon a newly-discovered sea filled with rocks and dangerous shoals, and should, therefore, proceed with the utmost caution.
88
Id. at 362. We have yet to find a harrow of recent and modern construction that does not embody one or more of our patents . . . [w]e regret that we are obliged to hold the dealers responsible, but this cannot be avoided, as in many cases the manufacturers would not be able to settle our claims." Id. at 829. 91 Id.
92
Id. at 831. The publicity of Adriance's suit caused National Harrow to bring several actions against the customers of Adriance; those suits were voluntarily dismissed. Id. at 830-31. The court remarked, "The inglorious conclusion of these suits may afford an explanation of the defendant's reasons for preferring to attack the complainant by the circulars and letters rather than in a court of justice." Id. at 831. Later, when the accounting awarded to Adriance in this litigation made Adriance National Harrow's only creditor in bankruptcy, the parties settled by giving Adriance ownership of all of the company's assets, including the patents and all claims for royalties. Adriance, Platt & Co., 121 F. at 830 ("Until the present action was brought, the defendant contented itself with warnings and threats to the complainant's customers, and made no attempt to prosecute an infringement suit.").
94
Compare id. at 831 ("We conclude that complainant was entitled to an injunction and an accounting."), with Bement v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 95 ("[W]e hold that the agreements A and B actually entered into were not a violation of the act.").
95
Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 234. Bement's main argument in the royalties case was that the harrows it sold did not fall within the existing license agreements for float spring tooth harrows, based upon a new round of license agreements, not signed by Bement, for lever spring tooth harrows. See Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 153-54. Bement, the appellate court declared the contract provisions that fixed the prices at which licensees could sell harrows and that limited manufacturers to selling only those harrows authorized in their individual contracts "void as against public policy." 126 The court explained, "These provisions not only stifle competition between the plaintiff's licensees, but effectually prevent them from attempting to make any improvement in harrows." 127 Moreover, the court also considered the agreements under New York's Stock Corporation law, which both prohibited and abolished "the creation of a monopoly or the unlawful restraint of trade or for the prevention of competition in any necessary of life." 128 Harrows were an important and necessary farm implement-these agreements could not be enforceable, the court continued.
129
National Harrow, like it had in earlier cases, argued that patents enabled patent owners or their assignees to enter into agreements that restricted production or fixed the prices of patented articles sold without concern for running afoul of competition law. 130 In response, the Court recognized the property right of patents, which are "subject, as is all other property to the general law of the land," 131 but a patent license agreement, like all other contracts, must be "subject to the limitations imposed by definite principles of public policy." 132 Using this private law framework, the court found the contracts contrary to public policy precisely because they 126 Id. at 463-66.
127
Id. at 466.
128
Id. at 467 (quoting Law of May 7, 1897, ch. 384, § 7, 1897 N.Y. Laws 313). The court stated, "A harrow is an implement as important as generally used by farmers as a plow, and is quite necessary for the proper cultivation of land as any other agricultural implement, and is in use on every properly cultivated farm." Id. Id. at 467-68. 131 Id. at 468 (quoting Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 293 (6th Cir. 1896)).
extended for the life of the patents, they controlled prices for a long period of time, and none of the licensees in the pool could capitalize on any improvements made during the license term. 133 National Harrow appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed again, not on the merits but on procedure. 134 The intermediate court's opinion below had not made clear that it reversed on the facts, leaving the appellate court to assume that the reversal was made on an error of law. 135 The appellate court could not find an error of law stated in the lower court's decision to reverse the referee. Id. at 768. 136 Id.
137
Id. at 767-68. 138 Id. at 768; but see Nat'l Harrow Co., 57 N.E. at 768 (Cullen, J., dissenting) ("In my opinion, the defendant conclusively proved by uncontroverted evidence that the two agreements declared on by the plaintiff were made in pursuance of the prior agreement referred to in the answer, and the written instruments, construed together, show an illegal combination. This was so held in [Quick and Hench] . In the views expressed in those cases I entirely concur, but it would be unprofitable to pursue the discussion in this respect, as the majority of the court hold that we cannot look into the record to see if the defendant has conclusively proved its defense, but are confined to the inquiry whether the facts found by the referee in his decision have the support of evidence, and, if there is evidence to sustain them, whether they authorize the judgment rendered. From this view of the practice and the power of the court I am constrained to dissent.").
139
See Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 1. 140 Bement v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S 70, 83 (1902 [W]hen the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case. . . . Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section 4 of this title may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned . . . and subpoenas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof. ." 148 Although the patent grant is made on the "reasonable expectation that he will either put his invention to practical use or permit others to avail themselves of it upon reasonable terms," the public has retained no ability to enforce those expectations. 149 As a general matter, a patent owner has the "absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United
States," subject to general public policy principles or the state police powers. 150 The Court concluded that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts. The fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up the monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal.
151
Having set out that such contracts were not presumptively illegal (yet also not presumptively legal), the Bement Court construed the statute to preclude its application to restraints that "may arise from reasonable and legal conditions imposed upon the assignee or 146 Id.
147
Id. Reviewing the agreements in question between National Harrow and Bement through this lens, the Court failed to find any violations of the Sherman Act. 154 The Big Six had resolved a large amount of litigation by forming National Harrow, which the Court described as "a legitimate and desirable result in itself." 155 The provision in the agreements keeping prices up in the licensed harrows merely "recognize[d] the nature of the property dealt in, and providing for its value so far as possible." 156 The patent owner can charge whatever price he chooses when he sells a patented article-it followed that the patent owner can require, by agreement, a licensee or assignee to charge a specified price. 157 With respect to the limitation on licensees manufacturing only those goods that it was making and selling prior to entering into the agreement with National Harrow, the Court found that these agreements did not stifle competition or prevent improvements in any manner more than the patents would have on their 152 Id. at 92.
153
Id. at 92 (citing United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 345 (1897)).
154
Id. at 93.
155
Bement, 186 U.S. at 93. Importantly, the Court failed to recognize the immense amounts of litigation brought by the National Company, some of which has been recounted in Part I. 156 Id.
own. 158 The Court read the agreement to allow Bement and the other licensees explicitly to use any patents that they might obtain otherwise (provided they were not infringing the patents of others). 159 Closing, the Court found nothing in the provisions, taken together or separately in the agreements between National Harrow and Bement, that would render the contracts void under the Sherman Act. 160 Importantly, the Court did not consider any agreements between National Harrow and other harrow manufacturers apart from Bement. 161 The referee, in the first instance, had not found from the evidence that the agreements identical to those with Bement had been found void in other jurisdictions, that other harrow manufacturers had entered into the same contracts, nor that "there was a general combination among the dealers in patented harrows to regulate the sale and prices of such harrows." 162 The Court could not assume facts not in evidence. 163 The referee concluded that the contracts between National Harrow and Bement were legal, valid, and binding contracts, and such as might reasonably be made under the circumstances, and were founded upon a good, valuable, and adequate consideration, and were reasonable in their provisions, and that they embodied no illegal restraints, and were not repugnant to any rule of public policy as in restraint of trade, and were not intended to create a monopoly, trust, or illegal combination . . . .
158
Id. at 94.
159
160
Bement, 186 U.S. at 94.
161
Id. at 85. The Court observed, "[W]e are brought back to the question whether these contracts or licenses, A and B, irrespective of any contracts found by the referee as in any way connected with, or forming a part thereof, are void as a violation of the act of Congress." Id. at 87. 162 Id. at 85. 163 Id.
164
Bement, 186 U.S. at 85.
No doubt, the referee's opinion on this matter and its limited findings on the record below frustrated any desire the Court may have had to expand its opinion to take into account the conduct of National Harrow at any level other than just the agreements with Bement. 165 The sweeping language of this relatively narrow contracts case influenced turn of the century patent and antitrust cases outside of the Harrow Trust context. 166 One contemporary author described the case as "strengthe[ning] the tendency to secure monopolistic control on the basis of patent right." 167 The following Part describes Bement's reception and modern doctrinal threads, the ways in which it has been forgotten, and the ways in which it may be useful to examine modern cases.
III. REVIVING BEMENT FOR THE MODERN AGE
The skirmish in Bement, with its rich facts and complex economics, ends with the patent owner victorious over a defecting licensee on a contract claim because the Court refused to consider the other identical assignments and licenses entered into by National Harrow, acting as a patent pool, in its attempt to obtain control over the entire harrow market. 168 By all lights, Bement should be a well circumscribed case in both fields of patent and antitrust law, given this contractual claim with a narrow federal defense joined with a limited record and publicly litigated facts ignored by the Court in its resolution. Curiously, then, courts in the early twentieth century looked upon Bement as establishing that patent agreements would be immune from 165 Id. at 95 ("If such similar agreements had been made, and if, when executed, they would have formed an illegal combination within the act of Congress, we cannot presume for the purpose of reversing this judgment, in the absence of any finding to that effect, that they were made and became effective as an illegal combination."). antitrust scrutiny. 169 This early embrace of Bement far beyond the confines of its own facts could not be sustained. 170 As the mid-century Supreme Court strengthened its interventionist approach to horizontal agreements, a mere sliver of precedent remained of licensee price restrictions. 171 In the modern age, Bement's embrace of patent monopolies lends itself to rote recitation by advocates, but the case has otherwise been forgotten as important precedent in either patent or antitrust law.
172
A. Early Days: A Patent Pool Origins Story
Two cases from the early twentieth century capture how broadly courts interpreted
Bement to approve of patent pooling agreements, including price and output restrictions, as per se legal instruments. 173 The Ninth Circuit, considering a very similar contracts case involving the Seeded Raisin Trust, held that contracts involving patents were "not void as against public policy, as tending to create a monopoly, or as obnoxious to the provisions of the Sherman antitrust act." 174 Arriving at this conclusion, the court recounted the facts of Bement in detail and held in favor of the patent owner on Bement's principles alone. 175 The cases were identical in some respects-both involved patent pools formed to avoid injurious patent litigations-but the The agreements clearly, therefore, transcended what was necessary to protect the use of the patent or the monopoly which the law conferred upon it. They passed to the purpose and accomplished a restraint of trade condemned by the Sherman law. It had, therefore, a purpose and accomplished a result not shown in the Bement Case. There was a contention in that case that the contract of the National Harrow Company with Bement & Sons was part of a contract and combination with many other companies and constituted a violation of the Sherman law, but the fact was not established and the case was treated as one between the particular parties, the one granting and the other receiving a right to use a patented article with conditions suitable to protect such use and secure its benefits.
198
In siding with the government, Standard Sanitary established that robust patent rights "do not give any more than other rights an universal license against positive prohibitions." 199 Justice Breyer reviewed the Court's older cases involving price restraints and settlement agreements to define "scope of the patent," coming to the conclusion that "patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the 'scope of the patent monopoly'-and consequently antitrust law immunity-that is conferred by a patent." 232 Some litigants might settle their patent litigation to share monopoly profits and to keep prices high for consumers (which will generally be anticompetitive under our antitrust laws), or they might settle to avoid the time and expense of a patent litigation (which could be neutral or even pro-competitive). 233 Determining whether the agreement in question falls within the scope of the patent cannot be the starting point, but a conclusion drawn only after assessing all of the circumstances using a rule of reason. 234 Moreover, a district court should be able to figure out whether those circumstances run afoul of the Sherman Act without delving into specific questions of patent law like infringement or invalidity. 235 In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts would define the scope of the patent as relating instead solely to patent law. 236 In his view, the whole point of a patent-to confer a limited monopoly as an incentive to encourage invention and sharing of public information 237 -requires giving the patent holder permission to engage in conduct that otherwise would violate the antitrust laws. 238 contracts: licenses, assignments, post-sale notices, patent pooling agreements as in Bement, and settlements like the "pay to delay" agreements challenged in Actavis.
245
This tension between patent policy (to encourage innovation using private exclusive rights) and other policies (e.g., to encourage competition through antitrust, to encourage bargained for exchanges through contract) is not a new one-the twentieth century Court visited this question in many cases, most involving patents and competition, but it did so for the first time in Bement. 246 Placed in this historical context, Actavis attempts to answer a profound question that has haunted the Court for more than a century: What kinds of anticompetitive restraints on trade are within the scope of the patent and which are without?
247
In Bement, the Court avoided the hard question of dissolving the Harrow Trust by focusing only on the contracts in evidence. 248 However, the public nature of the Harrow Trust's dealings, the decisions by at least two courts that the agreements in question in Bement were void as against public policy because they purported to restrain trade in harrows, and the extreme measures by which the trust protected its market share through threats of litigation and financial ruin apparently pushed some courts to interpret the decision as broadly giving patent agreements immunity from suit under the Sherman Act. 249 As the Court grew more antagonistic to patent See Bement, 186 U.S. at 92-93 (discussing the validity of contracts A and B in regard to the Sherman Antitrust Act). 249 Id. at 91 ("The general rule is absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United States. The very object of these laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few exceptions, that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts."). monopolies, the mid-century Court comprehended that antitrust law, in fact, could police some of the more egregious conduct by patent owners to remove competition between each other, to raise prices, and to restrict output. 250 Although the Court in Bement found no problem with price and use restrictions between a patent owner and a licensee, its inability to consider those restrictions in the context of a pool of competing patent owners who have agreed to sell substitute goods prevented the Court from earlier engaging with the complexities of a rule of reason. 251 In all likelihood, National Harrow's patent licensing scheme would not survive modern scrutiny under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 252 The misperception of Bement as a case championing complete patent immunity from antitrust liability also plays an important role in the history of patent law and antitrust. 253 Had the Court in Bement followed along with earlier cases rendering National Harrow's activity unlawful, perhaps a per se rule prohibiting patent pooling agreements would be its lasting legacy, long forgotten as a more sophisticated rule of reason has replaced older per se rules. 254 Instead, viewed in light of the debate in Actavis, regarding the contours of the scope of the patent applied to the unique circumstances of reverse payments, the spirit of Bement that frames a patent's exclusive rights as exceptional remains an integral part of this debate.
